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Sanchez v. Wal-Mart, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 60 (Dec. 24, 2009)1
Tort – Negligence and Wrongful Death 
 
Summary 
 
Plaintiffs/Appellants appeal from a district court dismissal of their complaint against 
several pharmacies for wrongful death and personal injury in a common-law negligence and 
negligence per se action. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
Affirmed.  The Nevada Supreme Court held that pharmacies owe neither a special nor a 
statutory duty of care to unidentified third parties, and that Appellant’s complaint was therefore 
properly dismissed by the district court for failing to state a claim for which relief could be 
granted. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
On June 4, 2004, Defendant Patricia Copening, not a party to this appeal, struck Gregory 
Sanchez, Jr. and Appellant Robert Martinez with her vehicle as they were attempting to fix a flat 
tire on US Highway 95, killing Sanchez and seriously injuring Martinez.  Copening was 
subsequently arrested for driving under the influence of drugs.  Appellants, Sanchez’s minor 
daughters and his widow, representing Sanchez’s personal estate, and Martinez and his wife 
brought wrongful death and personal injury actions against Copening, two medical doctors, and a 
medical association.   
 
Discovery uncovered a June 2003 letter from the Prescription Controlled Substance 
Abuse Prevention Task Force to several pharmacies and prescribing physicians informing them 
that Copening had obtained approximately 4,500 hydrocodone pills from 13 pharmacies between 
May 2002 and May 2003.  Plaintiffs/Appellants amended their complaint to add the pharmacies 
as defendants, alleging that the pharmacies wrongfully continued to fill Copening’s prescriptions 
despite the Task Force letter informing them of Copening’s prescription drug activities.  
 
The pharmacies moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim for which 
relief can be granted and for summary judgment.  The district court noted that in the absence of 
legislative authority on the question of pharmacies’ duty of care to unidentified third parties, the 
issue was governed by Nevada’s cases regarding dram-shop liability, which indicate by analogy 
that there is no proximate cause between filling valid prescriptions and the subsequent injury.  
Therefore, the district court granted the pharmacies’ motion to dismiss and denied the motion for 
summary judgment as moot, certifying its decision as final per NRCP 54(b).   Plaintiffs/ 
Appellants took this appeal.  
 
 
                                                 
1 By Shana S. Brouwers. 
Discussion 
 
The Court grants rigorous appellate review to an order granting a motion to dismiss2 and 
approached the question of law regarding what duty of care the pharmacies owed the Appellants 
de novo.3
 
  The Court also declined to discuss the district court’s analysis of dram shop liability, 
declaring it inapplicable to the present case. 
Because potential pharmacy liability to third parties was an issue of first impression in 
Nevada, the Court relied on a Florida District Court of Appeal opinion regarding the same issue, 
Dent v. Dennis Pharmacy, Inc.4  In Dent, the plaintiff was injured when a pharmacy customer, 
under the influence of prescription drugs, fell asleep at the wheel of her vehicle and struck Dent.5  
Florida’s district court dismissed Dent’s complaint because it did not sufficiently allege that the 
pharmacy owed the injured motorist a duty of care.6  On appeal, the court in Dent refused to 
recognize a duty of care between the pharmacy and Dent because the parties did not have a direct 
relationship to one another7 and Dent was not a known or identifiable third party,8 emphasizing 
that it would be overly inclusive to impose a duty of care on pharmacies on behalf of the 
motoring public as a rule.9
 
   
Analogizing the present case to Dent, the Court held that pharmacies do not owe a duty 
of care to unidentified third parties injured by a pharmacy customer because no special 
relationship exists between the pharmacy and the third party that would justify such a duty of 
care.  Based on this assessment, the Court declined to discuss the question of whether the 
Appellants’ injuries were foreseeable.  The Court further concluded that nothing in the express 
language or the legislative history or intent of Nevada’s public policy statement outlining a 
tracking program for controlled substance prescriptions10
 
 implies that pharmacies have a duty to 
enforce that statute’s provisions, and that therefore the policy statement does not impose any 
duty on pharmacies in favor of third parties.  Finally, the Court concluded that the Appellants’ 
negligence per se claims were properly dismissed because the statutes and regulatory provisions 
prohibiting the unlawful distribution of controlled substances are not intended for the general 
public’s protection or to protect against the nature of injuries sustained by the Appellants, but 
rather are intended to protect the pharmacy’s customer. 
Dissenting Opinion 
 
Justice Cherry, joined by Justice Saitta, wrote separately in dissent, arguing that 
Appellants had appropriately alleged a claim for common law negligence because a special 
relationship exists between pharmacies and their customers that extends to third parties and the 
injury to the Appellants was reasonably foreseeable.  Cherry based these conclusions on Nevada 
                                                 
2 Lubin v. Kunin, 117 Nev. 107, 110-111, 17 P.3d 422, 425 (2001).  
3 Turner v. Mandalay Sports Entertainment, 124 Nev. ___, ___, ___, 180 P.3d 1172, 1175, 1177 (2008). 
4 Dent v Dennis Pharmacy, Inc., 924 So.2d 927 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).  
5 Id. at 928.  
6 Id. at 929.  
7 Id.  
8 Id. 
9 Id.,  
10 NEV. REV. STAT. § 453.1545 (2009).  
law that implies that pharmacists may be liable for civil damages for improperly distributing 
prescription drugs with a lack of good faith,11 combined with the Task Force letter notifying the 
pharmacies of Copening’s potential drug abuse and the fact that the prescribed drugs, taken in 
such quantities in such a limited time frame, presented a reasonable likelihood that Copening 
might drive under the influence, risking injury to herself and others.  Cherry further disagreed 
with the majority’s assessment of Appellants’ negligence per se claims, noting that the 
Legislature directed the Board of Pharmacy to adopt regulations to “protect[ …] the public, 
appertaining to the practices of pharmacy,”12
 
 thereby indicating that regulations passed by the 
Board of Pharmacy are directly intended to protect the general public, of which Appellants are 
members.  Therefore, Cherry and Siatta would have reversed the district court’s decision to 
dismiss the Appellants’ complaint for failure to state a claim.  
Conclusion 
 
Because no special relationship exists between the pharmacies and the Appellants, 
Appellants could not properly allege a claim of common-law negligence for their injuries.  
Moreover, Appellants’ claim of negligence per se fails in the absence of evidence that 
regulations governing the distribution of controlled substances were intended to protect third 
parties from harm resulting from a pharmacy customer’s prescription drug abuse.  Therefore, the 
Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.  
                                                 
11 Id. § 453.256 (6).  
12 Id. § 639.070 (1)(a).  
